A short post featuring a document from 1958. This memorandum describes Canada's ability to build a prototype atomic weapon (and the difference between that and Canada's ability to produce atomic weapons).
The background to this document is complicated, so here's the abridged version for the Canadian diplomatic history enthusiasts out there:
In 1957-1958, Canadian diplomats were focused on how to prevent nuclear proliferation among friends and foes alike. (They didn’t call it “nuclear proliferation” quite yet, instead it was known as the Fourth Country Problem, as in, stopping a fourth country after the US, USSR, and UK from developing atomic weapons.)
In March 1958 Escott Reid, the ambassador in Bonn, picked up The New York Times and read an article by James Reston. Reston quoted Admiral Strauss — that is, Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission — saying that a nation "could design and construct without too great scientific difficulty a usable nuclear component" provided they had secured "a limited amount of fissile material.” Reid mentioned this story in one of his diplomatic telegrams.
Canada's Permanent Representative to NATO, Dana Wilgress, read Reid's telegram and wanted to know if what Strauss said was true. In Ottawa, Douglas LePan of External Affairs wrote to the Chairman of Canada's Defence Research Board (DRB), Dr. Adam Hartley Zimmerman, to ask for his assessment.
Zimmerman's response is fascinating because he uses Canada to illustrate his main point. (There is easier-to-read plain text below the photo.)
"The fact is that the DRB itself has, at this moment, enough scientific information to supervise the construction of a prototype atomic weapon - say 20" to 30" in diameter - which would be almost certain to work successfully. But in the production of atomic weapons, scientific capability is not the controlling factor. Far more important are the cost and the availability of manpower in the professions and skilled trades.
There is a long gap between scientific feasibility and production of atomic weapons. If one includes building up facilities for the production of fissile material, it probably takes 5 - 6 years to establish an atomic weapons program. Even if one assumes the availability of fissile material, it might take 3 - 4 years to produce a prototype weapon if a country had to start with no previous experience. But the accumulation of experience begins to pay dividends after 5 - 10 years, and at that stage, one would expect a country to be able to design almost any atomic weapon required, provided it were prepared to deploy the effort. Countries like France, Germany, and Italy are capable of putting forth such an effort if they are so minded. On the other hand, if by any chance Canada or a comparable country undertook a diversified atomic weapons production programme, it would be circumscribed by a shortage of skilled manpower, if not by the cost, and such a program would have to be a limited one."
The link to the document is here.
Zimmerman did not want the details of his memorandum shared widely, so he summed up his main point for broader distribution:
"… you might say simply that the DRB agrees with Admiral Strauss that there is probably little scientific difficulty in the design of atomic weapons, but that there might be difficulties in cost, manpower and time in some countries in establishing an atomic weapons production program."
And there it is, the secret to all things: money, people, and time. (And a little fissile material.)