In my recent post, I discussed two new articles, including Sam Eberlee's analysis of Herbert Norman's wartime intelligence work.
It appears there's an additional, previously untold aspect of Norman's story. Newly uncovered records from the end of the Second World War shed light on Norman's counter-intelligence activities in Japan.
In June 2019, I used the Access to Information Act to request a file from the Library and Archives Canada, titled "Liaison with British Security Coordination."
The British Security Coordination (BSC) was based in New York City's 30 Rockefeller Center, and led by Canadian William Stephenson. Known as “Intrepid,” Stephenson is an important figure in the history and the mythology of Second World War espionage. (Intriguingly, Stephenson owned an estate called Goldeneye in Bermuda, while Ian Fleming, the creator of James Bond, had an estate of the same name in Jamaica.)
After filing the request, I waited patiently for the release of the information.
Very patiently.
Too patiently.
Years passed. I filed a complaint with the Information Commissioner. The Commissioner issued orders to the Library and Archives Canada, compelling them to fulfill my request.
Finally, on November 21, 2023 — 1,617 days after my initial request — I received the documents, revealing new insights about Norman.
Painfully, the documents came just one day after Sam Eberlee's article went into final production. (They don’t change Sam’s conclusions, but it would have been nice to have them after 1,616 days!)
Nonetheless, now that we have the documents, we can share them on Canada Declassified.
Sam has thoroughly examined the newly released records and compiled an informative briefing book about this brief period in Norman's intelligence career.
You can check out all of the documents on Canada Declassified, here. Sam’s also included a useful reference list of officials mentioned in the documents.
Here’s the briefing book’s introduction, with links to key documents:
Between October-December 1945, historian of Japan, Canadian diplomat, and wartime intelligence officer Herbert Norman was posted to the US counterintelligence staff in Tokyo. This originated as neither a Canadian nor an American idea. In between the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japan's final surrender, Peter Cecil Wilson of MI6/British Security Coordination pitched this unusual assignment to senior US military intelligence officers, Norman himself, and Canada's Department of External Affairs.
The British Secret Intelligence Service was planning for a permanent postwar presence in Tokyo. But finding an officer with "profound knowledge of the Japanese language and of the country" to lead this work would "take time" (CDHN00009). Norman possessed both of these qualities. He could meet specific British intelligence needs and might even be well-positioned to "influence American policy" in Japan (CDHN00001). Wilson was less concerned about clandestine/subversive activities by Japanese intelligence professionals in the postwar period than the patriotic societies (and their members) that might nurture a future "renaissance of Japanese Imperialism." The British Secret Intelligence Service eventually hoped to penetrate these circles with covert agents. While Wilson did not expect Norman to build a network of spies and informants, he hoped Norman might take note of any Japanese who could be "useful in this connection" in the future (CDHN00009).
This briefing book sheds light on the high degree of integration of the American, British, and Canadian intelligence communities in 1945. Personal relationships forged in wartime shaped postwar intelligence cooperation within the North Atlantic Triangle. As head of Canada's Special Intelligence Section, which interpreted the meaning and significance of intercepted Japanese signals traffic for Canadian/Allied leaders (see the Special Intelligence Section Reports briefing book), Norman came into close contact with the British and American intelligence communities between 1942-45. Wilson therefore wrote about visiting Norman's wife Irene in Ottawa in the very same correspondence that set out short and long-term British intelligence aims in Japan. Wilson was also able to chat informally with senior US officers about, for instance, General Douglas MacArthur's independent streak, and how this might obstruct Allied intelligence work in Tokyo.
Norman spent approximately six to seven weeks in counterintelligence before being reassigned. This was not because External Affairs did not see value in the work he was doing for British and American partners, but because of the Canadian diplomatic corps' own "urgent needs." Norman was viewed as Ottawa's leading expert on the Asia-Pacific, so he was selected to represent Canada on the Allies’ Far Eastern Commission (CDHN00012).
Thanks Tim, for this: I look forward to reading the documents. I would just add that according to British intelligence records, Stephenson, whose formal status was that of head of SIS representation in North America, was never called Intrepid: I think 'Little Bill' and the other Stevenson who wrote his biography cooked that one up, personally.