The Secret Envelopes of the Korean War
Newly released records detail US hopes for a change of government in China; other details.
There are 84 file folders of archival records in the Department of External Affairs “War in Korea” series. Most of these records have been open to researchers for some time.
But not all of them.
When the files of “War in Korea,” 50069-A-40, were first opened, especially sensitive records from each folder were placed in a separate envelope and kept from researchers.
As a result, almost a thousand pages of historical records from this file group remained closed.
These secret envelopes are now open: 54 envelopes (and their contents) are available on Canada Declassified, here.
I’ve provided a few examples of the released documents below, to try and show the range of information. But this really only scratches the surface of the records.
Part 6: War as “an absolute godsend”
A “Top Secret and Personal” teletype from Canada’s ambassador in Washington, detailing a conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
Acheson described the war in Korea as “an absolute godsend.”
That Acheson felt this way is well documented, but it is still a bit jarring to read. He argued the war “made politically possible a huge and belated increase in defence expenditures in the United States,” and allowed a number of other adjustments he thought essential for waging the Cold War.
Part 21: U.S. policy toward China
In this closely held memorandum of conversation, Hume Wrong reports on a conversation he had with Dean Rusk, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (and later, Kennedy and Johnson’s Secretary of State).
Rusk told Wrong much about U.S. policy toward China, especially the American effort “to get China unhooked from Russia.”
The U.S. clearly “wished the existing regime in Peking to fall” and while the United States would not take “an overt commitment to bring it down,” they would “do something to confuse and impede its activities” in the meantime.
U.S. policy was clearly based on intelligence reporting that suggested splits in the Chinese leadership.
For more on U.S. policy toward China, see Part 43, below.
Part 25: Hot Pursuit
A memorandum for Pearson, seen and heavily marked up by him, about the “hot pursuit” issue and a possible American decision to bomb China.
The marginalia is interesting here, and shows why it is so important that all copies of historical records be released.
You can see Pearson working through the issue here. In paragraph 4, the author explains that the U.S. commander, Ridgway, has been authorized to retaliate against China if Ridgway thought this required but could not communicate with Washington.
Pearson seems to agree that this delegation of authority makes sense; that Canada would not object, at least “not if ‘he is physically unable to communicate with Washington.’”
But then, in reading paragraph 5, Pearson learned there is no way the American commander could be physically unable to communicate with Washington, surrounded as he was by several radio systems and submarine cables and wireless sets.
Pearson writes: “OK - if this is the case then he has no authority to act without consultation.”
This document seems to capture Pearson’s thoughts as he’s reading.
Part 28: USAF Bombing Runs
This memorandum was originally kept secret because it reveals the views of a foreigner, in this case, a British Colonel and Assistant Military Attaché. Colonel Figgess had shared his thoughts in conversation with Herbert Norman.
Figgess noted the tendency of U.S. Air Force bomber pilots “to run up an impressive score on paper of buildings destroyed and theoretical enemy troops in them.” In reality, “All that was accomplished … was the piecemeal obliteration of Korean villages with consequent hardships for the Korean peasants…”
Part 35: The USAF’s irresponsibility over the Yalu
An interesting bit of intelligence gathering by the Canadians here.
The target, on which they were seeking to learn more? The United States Air Force.
One source, a “USAF fighter pilot who had had a few too many drinks,” told a Canadian officer that American forays across the Yalu River, chasing MIGs on their way out of Korea and into China, were more organized and larger than previously thought, and revealed “an irresponsible disregard at the Group level or higher in the USAF” for U.S. promises to only cross the Chinese border in specific circumstances.
Here you can see how this conversation was drawn up as an “Air Attache Intelligence Report,” marked Canadian Eyes Only.
A second intelligence report came from a Canadian pilot on secondment to a U.S. squadron (but bankrupt in Tokyo!). The Canadian pilot had been on frequent flights north of the Yalu, and his American superiors had “gone to considerable length to impress upon him the importance of maintaining absolute silence on this matter.”
Pearson thought that while these flights “appeared to be the result of excessive zeal on the part of local commanders … they are no less dangerous on that account.”
Part 43: Eisenhower: “a change of Government in China”
A fascinating account by a General who sat beside Eisenhower at dinner in December 1952. “General Eisenhower,” was, at this point President-elect Eisenhower.
When asked how the war was to be settled, Eisenhower said “he thought we would ultimately have to look for a change of Government in China.”
Eisenhower explained that “the South Chinese were traditionally opposed to the North Chinese. By sending in agents, smuggling in arms, etc. it would be possible to encourage guerrilla activities in South China which would ultimately weaken the position of the Peking Government.
Part 60: “ice cream and cokes”
This document records a conversation with a British General, Major-General M.A.R. West, Commander of the First Commonwealth Division in Korea.
West drew an intriguing comparison between the fighting men of the Communists, on one side, with their one million men, and the 800,000 men of the United Nations.
These numbers, he said, were not a helpful indicator of strength, because of the “niceties” that UN forces required. He was clearly making a “tooth to tail,” argument, arguing that United Nations forces “needed all the amenities of ‘civilization’” and this reduced frontline fighting numbers.
His example: The Commonwealth Division was “entitled to 8 to 10 bottles of beer per week,” and so a whopping 200 tons of beer were shipped to the Division every seven days.
The Americans were not drinking beer, but had a similar problem “in importing ice cream and ‘cokes’”.
Over 50 years later, some people were surprised to learn about Tim Hortons in Afghanistan, or Burger King in Baghdad!